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THE ADVISORY OPINION FUNCTION
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
By DEE ASHLEY AKERS*

Though legal problems are normally solved by the courts in our
]ural society, there is another source of answers to questions of legality
which is authoritative yet which exists outside the channels of adjudication. This source is the Office of the Attorney General in the exercise
of its duty of giving official advice. The character of this function is
patently less than judicial, but it does have a restraining effect on the
administration of government, and in Kentucky the answers it provides make up a considerable portion of the layman's version of the law
Some evidence of the importance of this function and the extent to
which it brings about these results has been seen in the newspapers
where advisory opinions have made news almost as often as the
weatherman. In the fall of 1949, when this subject was first approached by the writer, correspondents of the Associated Press and
the United Press estimated that they had been distributing an average
of one advisory opinion news story per workday over their wires.'
These stories carried to the public the Attorney General's answers to
questions of law, and usually involved the authority of an official or
the validity of an administrative act.
Reactions to these written opinions vary from complete indifference
to absolute deference. There is surprisingly wide variation in the
weight given to them even among governmental officials and members
of the legal profession. To many of Kentucky's citizens, an Attorney
General pronouncement on a matter makes of it a closed issue.
In spite of the influences of this function and the publicity given
to these opinions, there is a dearth of published material appraising
this subject. This may be simply an example of literary lag. Books
on state government usually devote only two or three pages to the
Office of Attorney General, and the emphasis there is for the most part
on other functions of the office. The two-volume report of the
Efficiency Commission of Kentucky, entitled The Government of Kentucky,*-' prefaced its discussion of the Attorney General with the
* A.B., Political Science, 1948, LL.B., 1950, University of Kentucky; Managing
Editor, Kentucky Law Journal, 1950.
'This has not ahvays been the case. A perusal of state-wide newspapers prior
to 1930 shows almost no such stories. The index to the Courier-Journal from 1930
to 1934 (the only years indexed) does not disclose a single news item of this kind.
The Courter-JournalIndex, Louisville, Kentucky, 5 vols., 1930-1934.
" REPORT or THE EFFICIENCY COMWMISSION OF KENTUCKY, THE GOVERNMENT OF

KtrtcKY,, Frankfort. Kentucky, 1924, v. 2, pp. 9-13.
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" then progeneralization, "This office is an indispensable one
ceeded to cover the subject in a cursory manner. In that discussion,
however, considerable importance was given to the advisory opinion
work. Oddly enough, although writing these opinions constitutes for
the majority of attorneys general a large part of their work, the 1948
meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General was devoted
almost entirely to activities other than the work of writing advisory
opinions. There is scarcely a reference to this activitly in the entire
216-page record of the proceedings. 3 As might be expected there
has been little litigation on this particular matter. Kentucky has had
no cases ruling directly on the advisory opinion function, though
occasionally a case makes reference to a particular opinion relied on
by a litigant.4 Due probably to this absence of case history, legal
periodicals' only contribution has consisted of syntheses of opinions
without comment. There is no treatment at all m the general
periodicals through 1949. As is indicated by the press, such lack of
literary treatment does not parallel general interest. Most government
officials are concerned with the subject and many have very definite
views on it.
In this advisory opinion work then we have a governmental function directly related to our law and legal system-a function to which
is being attached some new quantities of importance, but about which
very little has been written. This study of the advisory opinion function and its effects is made in the hope that from such effort the proper
place and-function of the Attorney General's advisory opinions may be
more fully understood to the end that 'this very useful service may be
of even greater benefit to Kentucky's government and its citizens.
BASIS AND NATuRE OF THE FUNCTION

To understand this function it is necessary to know the nature of
the office of which it is a part, and the authority on which that office
rests. Supporting any governmental function, as exercised under our
constitutional governments, there is some lawful basis of power, an
authority to so function. The basis for the Office of the Attorney
3

Proceedings of the Conference of the National Association of Attorneys Gcieral, 1948, Council of State Governments, Chicago, Illinois, 1949. This association
does devote considerable attention to this activity in other ways. It publishes a
weekly digest of attorney general opinions; and its secretariat serves as a clearing
house for opinions to bring about uniformity in the interpretation of state laws
through the interchange of opinions. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1948-1949, Council
of State Government, Chicago, Supp. I, Jan. 1949, p. 8
"Meredith, Atty. Gen., v. Universal Plumbing and Construction Company, 272
Ky. 283, i14 S. IV

2d 94 (1938).
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General is found in history, constitutions, and statutes. For benefit
of perspective, a brief survey of these is in order.
Historically, the Attorney General is a familiar official, occupying
a place in English government since before the American Revolution.

In the sixteenth century two newly appointed law officers of the
crown-called the solicitor general and the attorney general-gradually
superseded the old serjeants-at-law 5 The solicitor general's work was
in chancery, while the attorney general's was in the common law courts.
The latter soon became the chief law officer of the crown. In the formation of governments in America after the Revolution, that office was
made a part of the state governments as well as the federal government, and at the present time all of the states have an attorney

general."
In Kentucky, as in nearly all of the states,7 the Office of the Attorney General is created by the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
With admirable brevity and flexibility, not common to the rest of that

instrument, section ninety-one provides for the election of an Attorney
General every four years, requirng him to be thirty years old and two
years a resident of the state. Most of the states employ this same
method of selection, 8 and more than half of them choose their attorneys general for a like term.0 A few states provide for his appointment
by the chief executive, and this method seems to be gaining favor

among those who would raise the efficiency of state government. 1
-, Knappen, M. M., CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, NEW YORK,
1942. p. 408.
THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1948-1949, Council of State Governments, Chicago,
Supp. fI, July 1949, p. 3. However Oregon had no attorney general from 1859 when
it entered the union, until 1891. Carey, Charles H., HISTORY OF OREGON, Chicago,
1922, p. 830.
Forty-four states provide for an attorney general in their constitutions. The
four states which make provision for that officer in their statutes are: Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 148 (1930); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 49-1920 (Burns
1933): Oregon, ORE. CoNiP. LAWS ANN. sec. 90-401 (1940); Vermont, VT. PuB. LAWS
sec. 409 (1933).
In forty-two states he is elected by popular vote. In Maine he is elected by
the legislature. In New Hampshire the Governor and Council appoint the Attorne General: while in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming he is appointed by
the Governor with the consent of the Senate. Tennessee employs the unusual
method of appointment by the state Supreme Court. THE BOOK OF THE STATES,
1048-194O, Council of State Governments, Chicago, Supp. II, July 1949, p. 3.
"Twenty-seven other states provide for a four-year term, while eighteen have
provisions for two-year terms. New Hampshire makes its appointment for five years,
and Tennessee's Supreme Court appointment is for eight years. THE BOOK OF THE
STATES, 1948-1949, Council of State Governments, Chicago, Supp. II, July 1949, p. 3.
In Pennsylvania the Constitution provides that the Governor shall appoint an
Attorney General "during pleasure." PA. CONST., Art. IV sec. 8.
"The Attorney General in Kentucky was originally appointed by the Governor
during good behavior. KY. CONST. Art. II, sec. 16 (1792). See LITELL'S LAws OF
(Footnote Continued on Following Page)
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The Constitution of Kentucky also requires that a candidate for the
office have been a practicing lawyer for eight years." He is ineligible
to succeed lumself,' 2 and is to be paid by salary only 13 In the absence of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and President pro-tern
of the Senate, he is to convene the Senate for the purpose of choosing
4
a President, and to administer the government until one is chosen.
The only other mandate in the Commonwealth's Constitution in
regard to the Attorney General-and herein is found constitutional
flexibility of which any state could be proud-is that which concerns
the work of that officer. Sections nmety-one and ninety-three both
declare that his duties are to be "such as shall be prescribed by law"
This is the extent to which the Constitution defines and provides
the basis of authority for the Office of the Attorney General in Kentucky The basis for its functions is found in the statutes and decisions.
The Kentucky statutes are not overly detailed in their treatment
of the work of the Office of the Attorney General. Chapter twelve of
the Kentucky Revzsed Statutes, in setting up the administrative organization for the Commonwealth, divides the departments into three
groups: the constitutional administrative departments, the statutory
administrative departments, and the independent agencies. Among the
constitutional administrative departments is the Department of Law Chapter fifteen is devoted entirely to this department. The first
section in the chapter establishes the Attorney General as the head of
the Department of Law The following section deals with his general
duties, including the duty to furnish written opinions. The first part
of that section reads as follows:
"The Attorney-General is the chief law officer of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and all of its departments, commissions,
agencies, and political subdivisions, and the legal advisor of all state
(Continued From Preceding Page)
KENTUCKY, VOL. I (1809).

The Committee for Kentucky advises that "Kentucky should consider making
appointive." Blueprint for a Greater Kenthe office
of Attorney General
tuckV, Report No. 12, p. 75 (1949).
The Subcommittee on Officers and Elections of the Constitution Review Commission for Kentucky considered the method of selection of the Attorney General:
"As the chief legal advisor to the Governor lie probably should be appointed by
(but)
The subcomiand be made responsible to the chief executive
mittee believes that the arguments for making the Attorney General appointive are
outweighed by arguments to the contrary. It also believes that public opinion
favors continuing to provide for an elective Attorney General, and so recommends."
Report of the Constitution Review Commission, p. 72 (1950).
nKy. CONST., sec. 92.
Ky. CoNsT., sec. 93.
Ky. CONST., see. 96.
'4Ky. CONST., sec. 87.
15Ky. REv. STAT. 12.020 (1948).
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officers, departments, commissions, and agencies, and when requested
inwriting shall furnish to them his written opinion touching any of
their official duties, and shall prepare proper drafts of all instruments
of writing required for public use, and shall exercise all common law
duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney-General
under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment."
The remainder of this section makes it his duty to represent the
Commonwealth in all cases in the Court of Appeals wherein the Commonwealth is interested, and "
commence all actions
before
all other courts
in or out of the state, and attend to all litigation
and legal business
" required by law or in which the Commonwealth has an interest, except where such is made the duty of the
Commonwealth's Attorney or the County Attorney
A 1948 statute, adding a new provision to the chapter on administrative organization, gives the Governor and other state officials the
power to employ legal counsel,' 6 but is followed by another section
providing that these same officers may still require the advice or
services of the Attorney General as before.ir
This same chapter requires the Attorney General to keep, in addition to an index of Commonwealth cases, a file, subject to public inspection, of "
all opinions rendered by him, alphabetically arranged."I'
It provides that the Attorney General may appoint six
assistants, setting up minimum age requirements varying from twentysix to thirty years of age, and requirements that they be practicing
lawyers for periods varying from four to eight years. 19 It makes it
the duty of the Attorney General to appoint an assistant attorney
general for each of four administrative divisions: the Department of
Highways,2" the Department of Revenue,2 1 the Public Service Commission,2 '-' and the Railroad Commission;2 3 and allows appointment of
additional assistants for the Department of Highways.2 4 This authorizes Kentucky's Attorney General to have a total of at least ten
assistants, which is only slightly below the average number of assistants in other states with similar populations.2 5 Then there are the
"Ky.
17Ky.
" Ky'.
K,.

REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.

Ky. REv.

STAT. 12.210 (1948).
STAT. 12.230 (1948).
STAT. 15.070 (1948).
STAT. 15.100 (1948).
STAT. 15.110 (1948).

- K. REV. STAT.
K ..REV. STAr.
Ky. REV. STAT.
'" KY. REV. STAT.

15.140 (1948).
15.120 (1948).
15.145 (1948).

15.115 (1948).
Tlc Attorney General of New York has 104 assistants; in Pennsylvania 152
are provided. Vermont authorizes no assistants as such. TiiE BOOK OF TiE STATES,
1148-1940, Council of State Governments, Chicago, Supp. II, July 1949, p. 3,
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26usual provisions for employment of stenographic and clerical help,
28
27
for the Attorney General's salary, and expenses. The present salary
of $5000-the lowest salary paid to an attorney general by states of
Kentucky's population 29 - was changed to $8500, effective in 1952, by
the 1950 General Assembly pursuant to a recent constitutional amendment raising the limit on state officers' salaries. In this state, as in
more than half of the states, he is allowed to engage in private legal
30
practice.

There are at least a score of incidental duties assigned to the chief
law officer. They vary from the duty to inspect nudist camps 31 to that

of publishing notices of proposed amendments to the Constitution. 3'-'
He is a member ex officio of several boards, 33 and is a trustee for the
34
teachers' retirement system.
Though there are no Kentucky case decisions concerned with the
advisory opinion function, the Court of Appeals has considered generally the limits of the Attorney General's authority In Johnson, Gov-

ernor v Commonwealth ex. rel. Meredith, Atty. Gen.,3 the Court
restated its view that inasmuch as the Constitution does not prohibit
the exercise of common law duties, they are a part of the Attorney
General's office.3 6 With reference to the constitutional mandate that
his duties are to be prescribed by law, the Court interpreted this to
authorize a limitation or restriction of duties as well as the creation of
duties. This interpretation is supported by the statute, quoted earlier,
15.150 (1948).
15.160 (1948).
K.
K
REV. STAT. 15.170 (1948).
"THE BooK OF THE STATES, 1948-1949, Council of State Governments, Chicago,
Supp. II, July 1949, p. 3.
'Ibid. This privilege of engaging in private practice was probably proper at
one time. It is not necessary now, however, as the position pays a livable salary;
it is more objectionable now because the government's legal business comes in such
quantity as to keep the chief law officer quite busy. Occasions when an Attorney
General has gone before the court in pursuit of private practice are most rare, as
are occasions when he should. Even today, however, there is probably no need for
this officer to break off all affiliations with private law offices.
3"KY. REV. STAT. 232.040 (1948).
"KY. REV. STAT. 118.430 (1948).
"KY. REV. STAT. 41.380: 56.340; 176.290 (1948).
"Ky. REv. STAT. 161.250 (1948). In Virginia, the Department of Law is required to supervise movie censorghip. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 378 (1942).
291 Ky. 829, 165 S. W. 2d 280 (1942).
In other states where there is no express inclusion or exclusion of powers and
duties of the attorney general at common law, courts have reached different conclusions. Some find the attorney general to have only statutory duties: R. R. Tax
Cases, 136 F. 233 (C. C. E. D. Ark., 1950); State v. Davidson, 33 N. M. 664, 75 P
373 (1929): State v. Industrial Commission, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N. W 579 (1920).
Others, like Kentucky, find that he has common law authority which can be altered
by statute: State v. Major, 181 La. 822, 160 So. 425 (1935); Cathcart Y, City of Columibia, 170 S. C. 362, 17Q S. E, 435 (1933).
KY. REV. STAT.
K. REV. STAT.
K
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which gives the Attorney General common law authority "
except
when modified by statutory enactment." In Johnson v Commonwealth
a statutory restriction was being challenged by the Attorney General.
In upholding the legislation, the Court of Appeals, speaking through
Commissioner Stanley, discussed the scope of the Attorney General's
office and the power of the legislature over it:
"In conclusion, we are of the opinion that, while the

Attorney General possesses all the power and authority appertaining
to the office under common law and naturally and traditionally belonging to it, nevertheless the General Assembly may withdraw those

powers and assign them to others or may authonze the employment
of other counsel for the departments and officers of the state to perform them. This, however, is subject to the limitation that the office

may not be stripped of all duties and rights so as to leave it an empty
shell, for, obviously, as the legislature cannot abolish the office directly, it cannot do so indirectly by depriving the incumbent of all
his substantial prerogatives or by practically preventing him from
discharging the substantial things appertaming to the office."'

Giving the Attorney General rights and duties of that office as it
existed at common law is of doubtful significance as it is most difficult
to know what those duties were. 3s Among those common law duties
generally accepted are: taking action for the enforcement of public
charities; supervising the estates of lunatics; taking action for abatement of public nuisances. ' It is from such common law practices as
these that the Attorney General derives general power to act in the
interests of the public as well as the state.
The Kentucky Attorney General's duties, then, seem to fall into
three general categories, excluding miscellaneous: advisory, legal
drafting, and representing the legal interests of the Commonwealth.
These, and the statutes, make him Kentucky's Chief Law Officer.
From this survey of the basis of the Office of the Attorney General
and its functions, it can be concluded that this office was created in
this state by the Constitution, thereby vesting it with common law
authority and such duties as the law prescribes; and that among such
duties is that of furnishing written opinions to other officials of
government.
In turning from the basis to the nature of the advisory opinion
function, it is found that all of its characteristics are not easily discernible. The office itself, of which this function is a part, is equally
difficult to fit squarely into the pattern of government. A popular and
291 Ky. 829, 165 S. W 2d 280 (1942).
SIbid.

"'5 AN!.

JUR.

234.
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easily understood conception of the place of the Attorney General is
that he is the state's lawyer. This is a good approach and is quite
accurate since a lawyer's work normally involves counselling, drafting
of legal papers and representing his client in court.
But the state has a greater number and variety of interests to be
served than does the usual client, which makes the problem of properly relating the Attorney General to the rest of the government more
complicated. Inherent in our constitutional system of government is
the proposition that government functions are to be divided among
legislative, executive, and judicial divisions, each separate from the
other. Such a separation of powers is expressly provided in Kentucky's
Constitution 40 which commands further that "No person
being of
one of those departments shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly
directed or permitted." 41 In dividing government functions in accordance with this pattern, the Constitution puts the Attorney General in
the executive branch,4 2 thereby making his position essentially admmistrative. This is the placement made in the majority of states, though
not all. 43 In Kentucky and the other states in which the Attorney
General is elected, it is of little consequence with which branch this
official is associated, for although he is often elected on the party slate
with other state officials, he holds a direct mandate from the electorate
which enables him to work independently of the rest of the administration. It would seem to be more in keeping with the policy of balancing the powers of government to make the legal section a part of
the executive branch, thereby preventing the same branch from exercising both prosecuting and judicial powers, although this lends additional political partiality to one who, in at least this particular respect,
should be as unbiased as possible. In spite of the reminder that "The
office of attorney general is not to be confused with that of prosecuting
10Ky.

CONST. sec. 27.

41 KY. CONST. sec. 28.
42

Ky. CONST. sec. 91.

SThose states in which the Governor appoints the attorney general are ob-

viously of that pattern; but the Constitution of Georgia (Art. VI, sec. 10), Iowa
(Art. V sec. 12), Michigan (Art. VI, sec. 173), Tennessee (Art. VI, sec. 5), and Virginia (Art. VI, sec. 107) include this officer in the judicial branch. The Maryland
Constitution establishes the Office of the Attorney General in a separate article
(Art. V). Of similar significance is the fact that in the federal government, as well
as in some state governments, the department of which the Attorney General is the
head is called the Department of Justice, rather than the Department of Law. The
Attorney General's position as part of the executive branch in Kentucky and the
majority of the states is in accord with the general conception that, "The powers
and duties of attorneys general are primarily executive-and administrative

7 C. J. S. 1222.
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attorney,"' 4 the Attorney General often has prosecuting functions and
is popularly thought of as a prosecutor. 45 The Kentucky Constitution
provides for the election of Commonwealth Attorneys,4 6 who do most
of the prosecuting work of the state, yet makes it the duty of the
Attorney General to prosecute all such cases when they reach the
Court of Appeals. 47 It has been suggested that generally. the civil
and criminal business of the state has been divided between the
Attorney General and the prosecuting attorney 4 s There is some
division along this line in Kentucky,, but the Attorney General still
has substantial criminal business to perform. 49 It would seem that
this prosecution function is justifiably part of the Attorney General's
service as "chief law officer of the Commonwealth" as he is described
in the Constitution, just as it is part of the service of a lawyer to represent his client's interests; and the state does have an interest in criminal
convictions.
The other major duties of this office, like the duty to represent the
Commonwealth, are primarily administrative. It.could not be argued
that the work of drafting legal instruments for public use would be
proper work for either the legislative or the judicial branches. As for
the legal advisory service, courts have notoriously declined to act
as legal advisors to the other divisions of government,50 and in this
state the right of the legislature to require the courts to give advisory
opinions has been denied. " i The declaratory judgment, in its limited
availability, is too cumbersome for the kind of advisory service needed
in many administrative operations. To the extent that these functions
were intended to guide and aid administration of government, they
were properly classed as part of the executive branch and in accord
with the general conception that, "The powers and duties of attorneys
,,52
general are primarily executive and administrative
From this examination it may be noticed that not all of the duties
are entirely compatible with each other and that some are not in
"17 C. J. S. 1213.
5n
5 Am.JR. 232.

"'Ky. CONST. sec. 97.

The Efficiency Commission in its study of the Attorney General says, "He is
the chief prosecuting officer of the State.
" Perhaps it is in explanation of this
that the Commission makes the statement that, "The authority of the AttorneyGeneral is rather more comprehensive in Kentucky than in most states." See note
47

2 supra.

115 A'a. JuR. 232.
"See note 2 supra.
21 C. J. S. 46.
Re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S. W 2d 692,
103 A. L. R. 1085 (1936).
z-7 C. J. S. 1222.
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harmony with the method of selecting the officer who performs them.
For example, in his prosecuting function the Attorney General is in
some cases called upon to sue the same persons whom he is required
to advise. He is to be the administration's counsel, but is elected so
as to place him out of the control of the executive branch. Yet if he
were appointed he would make a less impartial prosecutor. Perhaps
these functions should be put in two separate officials-one to act as
an independent elected prosecutor, and the other to be the appointed
head of a legal section to serve the administration. 53 A similar conflict of duties confronts the ordinary lawer who finds himself trying
to act in the interest of his client at the same time he is serving the
court. This conflict is of first importance in the attempt on the part
of the Attorney General to serve the public and its officials, the state
as well as administrators. But these are statutory considerations
that fall without the purview of this article. The primary purpose
here is to study the function as it is exercised under existing laws.
Although, as we have seen, the Office of the Attorney General and
its functions are primarily administrative in nature, there are some
judicial characteristics inherent in parts of his work. It has been
stated thus:
the attorney general cannot exercise any power
or possess any function essentially judicial in nature. However, in the
exercise of the functions incident to his office, an attorney general

is endowed with a large discretion over matters of public concern
and the exercise of such discretion is in its nature a judicial act over

which the courts have no control although the courts may control
him as to the exercise of his mandatory duties."'

To some extent this is a recognized exception, as permitted in
Kentucky's Constitution, to the separation of powers doctrine. The
Attorney General's advisory service may not appear off-hand to be
among those of his duties which make up this exception. He gives
advice on a formal and an informal level, and theoretically at least,
there is no reason why a lawyer's advice to his client should have any
substantial judicial effect. But practically it does. This is particularly
true where the advice is given by the chief law officer. These advisory
expressions approach a position almost parallel to advisory opinions
of the court. They approach this position because of the importance
of the client which exercises an influence at least equal to the courts,
G This is the idea behind appointing an assistant attorney general to serve a
certain administrative department. However, these department advisors still are
primarily part of the chief lawyer's office. The 1948 statute, referred to ahove, does
separate the functions in allowing departments to employ special legal advisors for
their own use. See note 16 supra,
7 C. J. S. 1223,

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS

and because of the consequences which follow them. Although such
advice is given in a purely ministerial capacity, it seldom stays within
administrative bounds. Thus:
"Although the opinions of the attorney general have in
no sense the effect of judicial utterances, in actual practice they are

usually followed. And there can be no question but that his advice

and opinions are of great influence in affecting public interests and

the rights of all persons within the state."
As was indicated in the introduction to this article, some officials in
Kentucky follow the Attorney General's legal advice almost without
question. There are suggestions that it should be so followed.56 As a
result, legally questionable propositions are quashed without benefit
of adjudication.5 7
This advisory opinion function then might well be described as
legal in essence, administrative in its character, and quasi-judicial in
effect. Its product, legal advice, is found in two forms, oral and written. The former is quite important, especially in regard to those
divisions of government which work closest to the Department of Law
This study, however, is more concerned with written opinions because
of their wider influence, accessibility, and documentary character.
OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF THE FuNcrION

The phase of the advisory opinion function pertaining to its actual
operation and effects does not lend itself to thorough, comprehensive
study The volume of attorney general opinions alone is prohibitive
of such treatment. There are so many thousands on file, 58 in accordance with the statutes reviewed above, that the bulk of the opinions
amounts to as much of a storage problem as their content does to a
source of informative material. 9 This volume of written opinions is
r5 Asa. JUR. 244.
r7 C. J. S. 1225.

discussing the Attorney General of the United States, the Cclopedia of
dIn
.-lmert-an Government says: "The Attorney General is legal adviser to the President
and heads of the departments.
The published opinions of the Attorney General constitute a body of precedents of a quasi-jtdicial character which come to
have an authority similar to the decisions of courts of justice." D. Appleton and
Co., New York and London, 1914, v. I, p. 93.
The file which is kept available for public inspection contains the opinions
written as far back as 1939. These alone number over 16.000. Files can be found
which date back to the 1920's; beyond that the status of records is a matter mostly
for the memory of the janitress.
"Opinions of the Attorney General were published in bound volumes in 1908,
1913, 1915, 1928, and 1930. Opinions of the Attorne , General of Kentucky, The
State Journal, Frankfort, Ky, These volumes contained only those opinions wuch
lhe Attorney General thought were most important, since to have published them
iFootnote Continued on Following Page)
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the most striking single feature of the function, and it is equally as
significant. About 1936 the number of opinions was running well over
a thousand per year. In 1940 an all time high of 2200 opinions was
issued-double the output of 1936. The average number of written
opinions for the past decade is approximately 1500 per year, but since
the last war they have been issued at the rate of about 1800 each
year. 60 At the present time the Department of Law often prepares
as many as ten written opinions each day, in addition to the informal
advice it gives orally This represents a tremendous amount of work
considering the nature of the task, and the size of the staff in the
office, together with the many other duties of the department.,, By
way of comparison, Indiana, the only state in this section of the country in which a similar number of opinions is written, provides twenty
assisthnt attorneys general-twice as many as are provided in Kentucky
The office of the Attorney General in Ohio is staffed with forty assistants, 62 yet that office has prepared only about 125 written opinions per
year for the last five years. Missouri and Virginia, other neighbors of
Kentucky, issue only 500 and 300 respectively per year. 6i In all of these
other states the Attorney General is required to furnish advisory
(Continued From Preceding Page)

all would have required several volumes. There has been no publication of opinions
since 1930-even of selected opinions-apparently because there have been no fundappropriated for that purpose. The absence of published opinions for two decades
makes it futile to attempt to estimate the valte of their publication, but it is obvious that, so long as the quantity of opinions is too great to include them all, so
that those published are only a fraction of the total written, the wisdom of a publication appropriation is questionable. A synthesis of the more significant opinions
is carried periodically in the Kentucky State Bar Journal.
'These figures are based on the filing numbers given to the individual opinions
tinder the filing system sn the office of the Attorney General. In a report to the
Governor, the Attorney General stated that Iss office had prepared 3,000 opinions
over the past two calendar years. This figure was probably derived by not including
those letters of less official character that are filed as written opinions.
The report which contained this estimate was a report of the activities of the
Department of Law for the biennium ending Dec. 31, 1949 pursuant to K. RiF.
STAT. 15.080. In spite of this statute this is the first such report submitted by this
department for many years. The Attorney General was quoted in the newspaper
as saying that this was the first since 1892. However, the volumes of opinions published in 1908, 1913, and 1915 (see note 59) indicate in their prefaces that they
were part of biennial reports made to the Governor, making this the first such report in 35 years.
61The Efficiency Committee was similarly impressed. In page 9 of its report
the Committee said, "This officer and his staff
have been with the possible exception of some of the judges of the Court of Appeals, the most industrious of the
officials at the Capitol." See note 2 supra.
62 See note 29 supra.
ICorrespondence with the Attorneys General of these four states: Indiana,
Norman J. Beatty, Law Clerk, dated Oct. 31, 1949; Missouri, Cance A. Pool, Chief
Clerk, dated Oct. 27 1949: Ohio, Joseph P Kinneary, First Assistant Attorney General, dated Dec. 1, 1949; West Virginia, Virginia M, Brown, Law Clerk, dated Oct,
31, 1949,
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opinions to the legislature and prosecuting attorneys as well as division heads.
One factor explaining this volume of opinions in Kentucky is the
lack of clarity in the statutes. 4 Another is the large number of political subdivisions of the Commonwealth. These factors tend to force
the quantity of opinions to be large in this state. However, they cannot account in full for the inordinate volume nor for the fluctuation
so evident in the number of opinions issued each year. Some change
in the number of opinions written occurs as a result of trends in government business. But most of the variation in the number of opinions.
as well as the quantity itself, is a direct reflection of the policy of the
incumbents of the office as to who is to receive this written advice.
Generally speaking, the policy followed in the past has been quite
liberal in that respect. About the only limitation noticeable when
this study was commenced was that the requests be in writing. The
opinions are normally in letter form, thus lending themselves to a
broad range of inquiry Although the requests seem to confine themselves to matters of law and government, a list of addressees of these
letter-opinions shows a variety much like the variety in the state's
citizenry itself. Practicing attorneys, voters, and candidates are very
popular clients; and advice has been written to artificial entities as
well as natural persons, alike to chief executive and anxious lover, to
foreign consulates, and even a London citizen65 As might be expected from such a variety of correspondents, some of the requests,
though legal in nature, afford extreme examples of what the office is
sometimes expected to do. Among such requests, providing lighter
topics of conversation within the law department, is one asking that
a deed be checked, and another requesting an abstract of a title. Aside
from such instances as these, it is difficult to find evidence of denial
of service.
In some respects 'this is commendable. The state government's
counsel has been providing legal information service for a wide public
indeed, which indicates a need for such service, at least where it cannot be otherwise obtained. But using the Department of Law to satisfy this need is not within the pattern as established by the lawmakers.
0' See note 2 sutPra at p. 12. This lack of clarity has been and is being conderabh improved by the work of the Statutes Revision Commission.
These illustrations are random selections. One opinion written to a London
citizen is number 22,002. Examples of opinions sent to the other recipients are:
number 23,067 to a foreign consulate; 27,946 to a courter; 922 to a corporation;
27,958 to an attorney. Opinions of the other two categories, natural persons and
chief eecutive, constitute the bulk of the opinions. Files of Opinions of the Attorney General.
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Harking back to the statutory basis of this function, it is recalled that
the chief law officer of the Comthe Attorney General is to be "

monwealth of Kentucky and all of its departments, commissions,
" There is no authority
agencies, and political subdivisions.
under the statute to act as chief law officer for interests other than
those of the Commonwealth proper.!; The statute makes a distinction
between those who are to regard the Attorney General as their law
officer and those who are entitled to legal advice from him, limiting
all state officers, departments, commissions,
the latter group to "
" thus not including political subdivisions. If folar'd agencies

lowed literally, the number of eligible clients would be reduced by
more than one-half. 67 This is of doubtful signifiance as it is difficult
to see how the Attorney General is to serve as chief law officer to

political subdivisions without giving them legal advice.

8

However,

it can be safely concluded that there is no authority to provide legal
advice to private parties. In spite of this absence of authority, such

" Prior to the Administrative Reorganization Act of 1936, the statutes required
the Attorney General to give written opinions to -'any exectilve or ministerial
officer of this Commonwealth."

CARROLLs KENTUCKY STATUTES sec. 112-2

(Baldwin

1934). Kentucky's first constitution-the only one wuch prescribed specific dutiesprovided that written opinions should go to either branch of the legislature and
to the executive department. KY. CONST. Art. II, sec. 16 (1792). See LITriLL'S
LAws OF KENTUCKY, V. 1 (1909).
In Georgia the Attorney General is the legal advisor of just the executive department. GA. CONsT. Art. VI, sec. 10. Floridas constitutional provisions are prac
tically the same (FLA. CONsr. sec. 22) with some enlargement by statute. FLs. STA I.
sec. 16.01 (1941). Indiana is most emphatic in its limitations on the function. That
state requires that the Attorney General shall furnish written opinions to the Governor, any other state officer, either house of the assembly, and "he shall not le
required to advise any other officer or person." 10 IND. ST.T. ANN. sec. 19-1908
1
(Burns 1933).
There is no Kentuck) case involving a right to a written opinion. The Court
of Appeals, however, has indicated its attitude as to who is entitled to the law
ciepartment's services in a closely related problem, saying that while a master commissioner is a public officer he is not a state or county officer, and neither the Attorney General nor the county attorney is required to represent him. Shannon v. Ray,
280 Ky. 31, 132 S. W 2d 545 (1939).
17See note 2 supra at p. 10.
13In Alabama a statute was passed and upheld giving the Attorney General
extra pay for the "extra duty" of furnishing opinions to county officials. Tayloe v.
Davis, 212 Ala. 282, 102 So. 433, 40 A. L. R. 1052 (1924).
The use of the phrase "political subdivisions'" in connection with the advisory
opinion function could reasonably include only counties. However, it has been
held that a municipality is a "political subdivision of the state." Smith v. Board
of Education, 111 F. 2d 573 (1940); Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. Ashland, 235 Ky.
there is
265, 30 S.W 2d 968 (1930). On the other hand an older case stated, "
nothing to support the contention of a separation between the city and the county
for governmental purposes." McInerny v. Huelefield, 116 Ky. 28, 37, 75 S. IN, 237,
238 (1903).
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parties have received many opinions6 9-at some periods of administration nearly half of the opinions that were written.
More than merely an excess of authority, this extension by policy
is an abuse, parasitical in nature. As is characteristic of most human
effort, the exercise of the advisory opinion function creates many problems in itself, and in its relation to the other functions of government.
Most of the more troublesome effects of the advisory opinion function
can be attributed in some way to this nearly-established practice of
giving advice to all who request it.7 0 There is nothing new in the idea
that such a policy is subject to criticism. It has been publicly discussed by the present Attorney General. At the 1948 meeting of the
Kentucky State Bar Association, the chief law officer spoke on the
problems of the office. Most of the address concerned the advisory
during
opinion work. The Attorney General pointed out that "
the past few years a great custom has grown up throughout the state
for members of the bar, county officials, and even individuals to ask
"There is a general idea within and without the law department that the
Attorney General is to furnish a written opinion whenever the inquiry invohes the state's business - whenever the question involves in) law or action
wherein some part of the Commonwealth has an interest. Thus focusing
attention on the subject matter of the requests, they are answered regardless
of who makes the inquiry. On this basis opinions have been written at the
request of the press - t)pical of the extreme privileges the press has in Amen(an democracy. This is probably harmless, yet is even less proper, procedurally
qpeaking. because in such case there is not even an interested party in the legal
sense. The whole idea that the subject matter is controlling is not amenable to
the statttory language. The requirement as to subject matter is a qualificationa limitation on tie rights of those who are authorized to request opinions, and not
an enlargement of the advisory opinion function as it has been thought to be. The
Departnient of Justice of the federal government bluntly avoids such a practice
with a ruling that the United States Attorney General ought not to advise individuals in regard to any question of legal right pending between them and the
government. This ruling quite clearly repudiates the idea that an opinion should
be g en just because the request concerns a matter which affects the government
in sonic way. 6 C. J. 811 11.65 (B).
The position of the Attorney General in relation to the rest of the state was
rather tersely put by a California court: "The constitutional provision that the
can be no more than descripAttorneN General shall be the chief law officer
tive and vests no more authority in the Attorney General than the constitutional
provision that the supreme executive power of the state shall be vested in a chief
magistrate, who shall be styled the Governor, vests in the Governor." People v.
Brophv, Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P 2d 946 (1942). Like the chief executive of the
'tate is not the chief executive of municipalities and John Q. Public's affairs, nor
even all affairs connected with the Commonwealth, the chief law officer is not chief
lawyer for all the interests within the state borders. Commonwealth functions are
confined to the Commonwealth's sphere of operation as part of a scheme known as
"division of powers."
7cThe Department of Jusice of the federal government recognizes this source of
possible trouble and has ruled that the United States Attorney General is not authorized to give official opinions in causes not falling within the scope of his duties,
so as to connect the government with individual controversies in which it has no
concern, and with which it ought not to interfere. 6 C. J. 811 n. 65 (B).
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the Attorney General for opinions touching upon their individual
cases." At another point in the address he indicated the extent of the
custom more specifically "In the first three months of my present term
as Attorney General, we have received many thousands of requests
for opinions as to the rights of individuals." Thus recognizing the
impropriety in such a practice, he announced, "
it will be my
purpose
to eliminate such opinions wherever possible." [This is
the first attorney general pronouncement to this effect that the writer
found.] However, he went on to mention that, since it was often
necessary to answer the correspondence, "
it is very easy to call
to the attention of the inquirer the section of the Statutes or similar
case which deals with the problem involved."T
It is believed that this is not too unrepresentative of the views held
by most of the attorneys general who have held the office since the
"custom" first got its start; and in view of the few influences evident
at this time to curb the practice, the "custom" is destined for a long
life. The temptation "to call to the attention of the inquirer" the law
on the subject no doubt results partly from the elective status of the
department head. A personal answer from an office of such dignity
is a political seed of no small potential. The constitutional restriction
72
against self-succession only serves to make this temptation stronger.
Supporting such reasons there is undoubtedly a desire to do service.
This is evident from the work performed by the assistants as well as
that of the policy-maker.
Judging by the conduct of the function in the past, the idea of
curtailing the custom-policy seems to have been outweighed by the
motives for continuing it, in spite of the acknowledged impropriety
of the practice. Such is apt to be the fate of an idea supported by
reasons known but one at a time, by only a few persons. Since this
appears to be the situation, emphasis in this study is on the effects of
this mispractice, with a design to seaich out reasons which will support the idea of abating this custom, and to give these reasons new
Importance.
The announcement of a purpose "to eliminate such opinions wherever possible" was probably prompted by the fact that they are
unauthorized, as explained above. In support of this criticism it could
be argued that such conduct of office amounts to expending state funds
-1 12 Ky. S. B. J. 136 (Je. 1948).
Subcommittee on Officers and Elections of the Constitution Review Commission recommended the elimination of the prohibition against self-successlon in
Kentucky's Constitution. Report of the Constitution Review Commission, p. 72
(1950).
72The
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in an unauthorized manner, at least indirectly; and, that tis kind of
official behavior is in conflict with a fundamental concept that ours
is a government of laws and not of men. But these arguments lack
appeal in the face of proof of beneficial service. More important, it
seems, is the fact that such a practice is not only in conflict with statute and political doctrine and auditmg principles, but is also inconsistent with the theory behind the creation of the function-mcompatible with the purpose for which the function was provided. The
Office of the Attorney General was established to furnish legal counsel
to the working arms of the government of the Commonwealth. It
was intended that this office be retained for the exclusive use of this
very important client,7 3 and not that these services be shared with as
many other clients as might be found in the general public. From the
standpoint of man-hours alone, a department cannot do its assigned
task well if it takes on a large amount of unnecessary work. Neither
can it produce the same calibre of service if it assumes to serve additional purposes. For the most part, the interests of government and
those of its citizens are the same; but the occasions when either the
government or a citizen needs legal advice badly are frequently instances where one of them is trying to extend his activities as far as
possible, stopping just short of violation of the other's rights, as it
has been said everyone has the right to do. 74 In situations such as
those, neither party, can get much real benefit from middle-of-the-road
counsel; worse vet, the help to such an inquirer in this kind of advise
is sometimes a better idea of the position of is potential adverse party
This is hardly fair to the client who pays the retainer fee, and is
especially hard to condone when the origin of the inquiry is neither
one of the state's offices nor one of its citizens.
The ill-effects of this theoretical incongruity are both practical and
numerous. The self-assumed, extra work of answering everybody's
inquiry burdens the processing of governmental requests to such an
extent that a few administrators have complained that the service is
sometimes too slow to be of use to them. Of course, this trouble can
be met by giving priority to authorized requests, which is probably
normal procedure. Of more serious nature are the ill-effects on the
quality of opinions. As was concluded above, this function is legal
in essence, which indicates that it requires careful, thorough work.
,aThis idea that the law department is for the exclusive use of the Commonwealth's government is recognized and extended by the statutes requiring and
allowing assignment of assistant attorneys general to specific departments thus pernutting these assistants to give all their legal attention to those departments. See
notes 20 through 24 supra.
11Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 395, 74 L. Ed. 504, 508 (1929).
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This kind of work is evident m many of the written opinions. However, it has already been shown that the amount of work represented

by the number of opinions issued in Kentucky far exceeds that expected of larger staffs m adjoining states. Regardless of sincere effort,
law work done under such pressure can hardly help falling below the
standards of the profession. Opinions written under these conditions
are not only weak, but in some instances lack all of the characteristics
of legal writing, amounting to little more than curbstone impressions.
A London citizen's inquiry regarding Kentucky lav might be properly
handled by a conclusion without the barest reference to authority; but
an administrative head whose principal activities are so dependent on
law, is entitled to a thorough investigation into a matter with which
his work is concerned. Of course, the bulk of opinions written to
officials do refer to pertinent statutes, and occasionally a case in point;

and most of the less carefully prepared opinions are addressed to
parties not entitled to them under the statute; but too many of the
former are not as complete as the importance of government business
requires that they should be. In any group of legal memordanda are
found some with which a court would disagree; but when the memorandum takes on the character of an official opinion, it is rightfully
expected to be more dependable. The mortality rate of opinions prepared on a mass-production basis quite naturally is higher than it
75
should be, considering the nature of the function.
Another misfortunate by-product of this process is a lack of continuity through opinions on the same subject. His opinions being
non-judicial, an attorney general is not as restricted by the implications of the doctrine of stare deciszs as are the courts; nevertheless, the
"'Some opinions are short-lived because they are withdrawn. These are hard
to trace because they are represented only by it missing number in the files. Many
live at most a ghost-life because some administrators do not treat them as binding,
and the difference is never ironed out. When such an administrator thinks an
opinion is wrong, he follows a course of action contra to that opinion, and sometimes his action is never challenged. The opinion then is of no effect though it
cannot be said to be dead. Sometimes, however, opinions do come up for a test in
the courts. The following are a few more familiar examples of Attorney General's
opinions which were erroneous according to subsequent court decisions, usually in
declaratory judgment actions: an opinion that the state university could not admit
a Negro to its graduate school, cf. Johnson v. Board of Trustees, 83 F Stipp. 797
(1949); that a corporation had no right to transact business under an assumed
name, cf. Meredith v. Universal Plumbing and Construction Co., 272 Ky. 283, 11-1
S. AV 2d 94 (1938); that certain expenditures were authorized, cf. Dishman v. Coleman, 244 Ky. 239, 50 S. V 2d 504 (1932); that game wardens are not authorized
to check bag limits on private waters, cf. Draffen v. Black, 302 Ky. 775, 196 S. W
2d 362 (1946); that 1940 Aid to Dependent Children legislation was unconstitutional,
cf. Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S. 1V 2d 437 (1942); that the legislature could
not reimburse an administrator held civilly liable for spending state funds in an
unauthorized manner, cf. Dept. of Finance v. Dishman, 298 Ky. 545, 183 S. W 2d
540 (1944).
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principles of the doctrine are not to be denied their value in any phase
of legal activity Though a chief law officer is entitled to a change
of opinion, there is much to be gamed by giving more attention to
making the first advice sound. When a change of opinion is necessary the opinions should be distinguished and overruled much like
cases, instead of being merely withdrawn.
A change in law department chiefs sometimes results in even more
change in opinions. It seems that proper procedure would call for an
examination of the former official's opinion and the facts on which it
was given to enable proper steps to be taken to eliminate confusion.
Many opinions do contain an explanatory reference to another given
by the same person, but only in the most controversial instances is the
trouble taken to properly relate the new opinion to one written by a
former attorney general on the same subject. More than one official
has found himself acting in accord with the chief lawyer's advice, only
to have a citizen come in with an old opinion to the opposite effect.
A former revenue commissioner determined a property tax as per advice from the law department. One taxpayer stubbornly refused to pay
the tax. In defense of his position the taxpayer came to the capital
only to learn that an opinion which he had obtained some years before,
and on which he was relying, was now out of style. Neither party
knew of the other opinion. No doubt, the taxpayer felt that he would
have been better off without the opinion; the opinion was given to
him out of nothing more than courtesy
Contrariety and incorrectness in written opinions can also be traced
to other causes found in the method of preparing the opinions. The
procedure used, working towards the legal conclusion which goes to
make up the advice, lacks many of the elements of legal work, much
as do the opinions themselves on occasion. Behind every bona-fide
request there is at least a possibility of impending controversy, yet
many opinions seem to be written with a minimum of respect for this
possibility, and some seem to have only the inquirer's side in mind.
Where the opinion is like to affect others, care should be taken that
there is not some controlling factor omitted by the inquirer. Protection against this kind of trouble could be obtained by a requirement
that all requests contain a clear statement of the facts as well as a
question of law Proper practice would require disposing of such personal requests without an opinion, so as not to connect the government
with controversies in which it has no interest, and in which it ought not
to interfere. 76 Where it appears that the inquirer wants to assert a
"See note 73 supra.
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right against some administrative activity, special care must be taken
to get the whole picture to prevent subsequent action on a misunderstanding. A better precaution yet is to consider such inquiries, like
other personal requests, not entitled to an official opinion, because the
interest involved is adverse to the interests of the Commonwealth.-Even if opinions be denied the general public, just as much caution
must be exercised because of the publicity and effect given to written
opinions at the present time. A request by one governmental division
concerning a matter which might be related to some activity of another division ought not be answered without at least contacting the
other division for the sake of harmony as well as for the sake of the
conclusion to be reached. Judges have been known to seek out and
consult with administrators before making a decision. Such consideration on the part of preparers of advisory opinions would not only
improve the quality of opinions and make for better inter-department
relations, but would also save taxpayers' money occasionally Most
problems, particularly tax matters, do affect more than one department.
On one occasion some years back the revenue department was working on an inheritance tax problem. After some long, hard work wich
was nearing completion, the department learned, quite by accident,
that an attorney general opinion had been issued covering the point
precisely There are indications of more effort to avoid this sort of
trouble now
In studying the effects of this kind of operation of the advisory
function, it is again quite difficult to cover the field. The consequences
seldom appear in the opinions, so they must be learned elsewhere.
Newspapers occasionally provide some information, but the occasions
are not frequent, and the information is usually sketchy The best
sources are the administrators and others connected with the state
government now and in the past. Interviews with these officials are
helpful but not always satisfactory Some seemed quite reluctant to
say anything which might be considered a disclosure; a few were
rather indifferent to the problem; a few were very helpful. Many
ill-effects were discovered some of which are, by their nature, more
noticeable than others.
Trouble sometimes arises from failure to consult departmental
regulations duly filed, or to give deference to department policy
Regulations must be within constitutional and statutory limits to be
valid, and consideration of them often forces a different conclusion
' See note 72 supra.
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than that which would be reached in their absence.7 8 Long-established
policy is entitled to some consideration, especially where the proposition is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations. One department
had determined itself to be subject to the provisions of the Hatch Act,
and so prohibited its employees from holding offices in political parties.
An employee of the department asked the Department of Law for an
opinion as to his right to hold such an office. The Attorney General
honored the request, coming to a conclusion which agreed with the
departmental policy without making any check with the head of the
employee's department. Such oversights do not always have such
trouble-free results. In much the same manner an attorney general
wrote an employer an opinion that a wage-hour provision calling for
a minimum of fifty cents an hour with time-and-a-half for overtime
meant that an employer paying seventy-five cents an hour regularly
need not pay more for overtime. The Department of Industrial Relations had been requiring time-and-a-half for overtime regardless of
base pay The difficulty was cleared up leaving the department's ruling undamaged, but not because of any deference to it as a departmental policy.
Similar treatment was accorded a long-standing interpretation of
a provision pertaining to teachers' sick leave entitlements. In spite
of a statutory requirement that the Superintendent of Public Instruction is to interpret school laws, and contrary to the education department's ruling that the annual number of absences due to sickness must
be apportioned over the school year, the Department of Law wrote
an opinion to a teacher concluding that if he taught for any length of
time he was entitled to all of his sick leave paydays for the rest of
that year. Both interpretations were reasonable but of two reasonable
interpretations, the one which was applied over a period of time by
the administrator authorized to interpret and apply it, should be considered a basis for a conclusion of law to be included or at least overcome in official advice on that problem.
These illustrations show not only a need to consider departmental
policy, but also how impossible it is for an attorney general to know
the details of all the activities of all the government divisions, so as to
make a pre-opimon conference with departments concerned an es11Chapter thirteen of the Kentucky statutes, dealing with the enforcement and
reivew of administrative orders, has a provision that the courts shall take judicial
notice of regulations duly filed. Kx'. REV. STAT. sec. 13.060 (1948). Administrative
regalations are more readily available now in code form, known as KENTUCKY'S
Au, ,%ItTN1tSnuVi.CODE which is accompanied by periodic publication of KENTUCKY'S
ADMINISTRArION RFGiSTriR, all pursuant to Ky. REV. STAT, sec. 13,040,
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sential to good advice. These illustrations show, too, how the government's legal advisor has come to be regarded as a sort of bulwark
against government administration, rather than an aid to it.
There are some grounds for administrators' referring to the advisory opinion function as "attorney general administration." Where
so many opinions are written there are certainly many administrative
points involved; and many of these points are such as would be
handled just as well or better by the administrator, making the opinion
not only unnecessary but also unduly supervisory Moreover, opinions
sometimes contain extra bits of advice unsolicited. One administrator
sought advice on procedure he should follow toward certain ends; the
advising opinion made suggestions regarding the ends, too. In another
such instance one lesser official requested an opinion as to whether
the Governor could remove him. He received an opinion stating that
the chief executive had such power. The opinion went further to
add that the Governor would probably allow the official to stay on
for the unexpired term. Acting on this extra advice the official refused to turn over the keys to the new appointee. It was necessary
for the Attorney General to write another opinion explaining that the
removal was not being postponed for the duration of the term. An
even more singular example is an opinion written to a policeman to
the effect that the town should raise his salary This sort of conduct
may be another reason for the conclusion made above, that the advisory opinion function is administrative in character. 79 To a few administrators this "attorney general administration" amounts to an attitude
of superior authority-a bossiness-which is distasteful to them. It
can probably be explained in terms of an "occupational disease"
among lawyers; but it results in a reluctance on the part of those few
administrators to use this function.
It was also concluded above that this function is quasi-judicial in its
effect. This is the backbone that makes all of these other ill-effects
stand up and cause trouble. It is what makes advisory opinions
supervisory and extra advice dangerous; and it makes it more necessary that opinions be correct and consistent and sound. The conclusion that this function has some judicial effects is based on rather
general ideas, such as that officials should follow the Attorney Gen"0In the Attorney General's speech, cited above, he indicated that advice on
administration per se is part of the advisory opinion function, by talking about
being called upon "
for opinions as to
policy.
" See note 71 Supra.
The Committee for Kentucky, however, in suggesting that Kentucky consider
making the Attorney General an appointive official, referred to that official as a
"technical and non-policy determining" officer. Blueprmt for a Greater KentuckV,
Report'No. 12, p. 75 (1949).
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eral's advice-and that normally advice in these opinions is followed.
This conclusion is not an overstatement in this particular state for the
reason that about one-third of the constitutional and statutory administrative departments of the government of Kentucky treat written
opinions not as merely quasi-judicial in effect and preferably to be
followed, but as absolutely binding. As might be expected these
departments are the ones that enjoy the best relationships with the
Department of Law The law department quite naturally feels that
a request for an opinion should not be made where there is no intdnt
to follow the advice in the opinion. This is a practical consideration
and basically good for the purpose of eliminating frivolous requests.
But this purpose could be accomplished by a requirement that there
be an intent to use the advice, following it only where, giving it weight
as legal advice, such action would be m the best interests of the state.
It is not law, so it should not be treated as law Those authorities
which say that advice in written opinions should be followed are
plainly not making it mandatory that they should be followed. It is
even questionable that it should be followed, for there is no persuasive
reason why an administrator, who is responsible for the administiation of his department, and often himself a lawyer, should blindly pursue a course deemed best by an advisor neither connected nor familiar
with the administrator's departmental affairs. Judicial viewpoits,
generally considered to be among the most stable in government, roam
the range from liberal to conservative. Attorneys general are no less
susceptible to variation. If department policy is subjected to change
with each turnover of legal advisors in addition to the other changes
it undergoes, the effects are sometimes quite disturbing. For example,
a statute provides that appropriated money not spent by the end of
the fiscal year goes into the general fund. In the early part of the
war the near impossibility of getting prompt shipments of purchases,
and its attendant administrative hardships, caused the Attorney General then in office to advise a department that the emergency would
allow the money for orders placed before the end of the year to be
held and used to pay for the shipment when it arrived. This practice
was followed to some extent to almost the end of the war. Then a
new attorney general wrote an opinion that the lav meant that if the
money was not paid over by the end of the fiscal year, it would go into
the general fund. Into the general fund went department appropriations which had been earmarked as part of the financial plan of the
department. Supplies and activities were curtailed, resulting in less
service to the public. Neither opinion was challenged; both were
followed,
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Sometimes this binding effect, so often given to opinions, causes
not only a loss to a department but also a loss to the state. In 1940
the General Assembly passed an Aid to Dependent Children Act,
conforming to the parent act passed by Congress, thus making Kentucky eligible to receive federal money aid for its welfare program.
An attorney general opinion was issued to the effect that the Kentucky
Aid to Dependent Children Act was unconstitutional. Reacting with
absolute deference to this advice, the Welfare Department did not
administer the legislation. The federal funds were withheld. Then, in
December of 1942, a dependent child brought an action to enforce
the Act. The Court held that the Act was not unconstitutional."0 The
lower court had held likewise, but the Attorney General had appealed.
Here, giving this opinion judicial effect amounted to "attorney general
legislation" as well as "administration," and resulted m a huge financial
loss to the state, as well as a restraint of aid to those whom the legislature intended to benefit.
An extreme example of about-face opinions concerned the applicability of the state amusement tax to county fairs and fair concessions. The first opinion advised that it was applicable. After the
initial efforts to collect it were made, that opinion was withdrawn
under pressure from county officials and fair people. The withdrawal
was accomplished without formal request, without the nicety of another opinion or even a legal reason. A new attorney general suggested that the revenue department again submit its request for an
opinion. It did, getting in answer substantially a rewrite of the
original opinion advising that the tax was applicable. Attempted collection again resulted in the same reactions and withdrawal in the
same non-legal manner. Meanwhile taxes had been collected and
much confusion resulted. Resistance to the tax was successful without
an attorney general opinion; the tax could not be successfully collected with one. There can be no condoning such a series of written
opinions. Surely no one would contend that an administrator should
follow this kind of bantering as a matter of course. In spite of such
juggling of opinions there is still a general idea that they constitute
binding advice.
Not all opinions are requested for advisory purposes; some are requested for other uses which are subversive of the spirit of the
advisory opinion function, and which put extra burdons upon it. For

8' Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S. V 2d 437 (1942). The language in the
Kentucky act, to which the Attorney General objected, was identical to that used
in the federal act. Moreover, in Kentucky the presumption in favor of constitutionality of statute is strong. Manning v. Sims, 308 Ky. 587 213 S. IV 2d 577 (1948).
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example, there are requests for opinions which will shield an administrator in some way The most understandable of these ways occurs
in connection with spending state money A written opinion from the
Attorney General, advising in regards to an expenditure, protects
the administrator from criminal liability for misappropriation of government funds. However, such an opinion does not protect him
against civil liability, but leaves him responsible for actions of his
department. In one such case, an administrator's bondsman was required to pay on this civil liability The General Assembly saw fit to
reimburse him, but only after many years delay si
Other ways in which administrators misuse written opinions are
less allowable. Opinions have been used to eliminate necessity for
taking action on a matter. More often they are-requested for the purpose of showing some lobby group or other interested party that the
official cannot help them. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney
General that a certain procedure is unauthorized usually serves to relieve the pressure. These uses are improper, but the point is hardly
worth belaboring since it is almost impossible to tell what the motive
is behind a request for an opinion. The matter could be improved
somewhat by requiring officials to submit more detailed information
in their request so that the chief law officer has a better chance to
understand the situation. Then too, less confidential administration
would enable the Attorney General to be better acquainted with the
problems with which the requests are concerned.
Of course, no abuse is so bad as the use of the function for political
purposes, and apparently such use has been made of it by both
requesters and advisors. It has in the past been misused as part of
an effort to harass the chief executive of the state to such an extent
that he was forced to make other arrangements for legal counsel for
government business. On occasion, political factions have been able
" In holding the administrator liable the Court said:
"This court has no alternative but to hold public officials to a strict accountability under the law, and even though the officer thought he was doing what was
best for the commonwealth, and had the concurrence of the Attorney General at
the time. the fact remains that in a government of law and not of men such an
error of judgment on the part of an officer renders him civilly liable for an), loss
resulting to the commonwealth." Dishman v. Coleman, 244 Ky. 239, 248, 50 S. V
2d 504, 508 (1932).
After the legislature appropriated the reimbursement, the constitutionality of
the appropriation was questioned by the finance department on advice of the law
department. The Court upheld the validity of the appropriation. Department of
Finance v. Dishman, 298 Ky. 545, 183 S. W 2d 540 (1944).
The United States Attorney General gives no opinions to administrators re
garding spending government money. He refers these questions to treasury departiient's auditor, from whom lie will accept requests for opinions as to expenditures. 6 C. J. 811 sec. 16.
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to get opinions which they use as weapons of politics. For example,
one group sought and obtained an opinion that a state representative's
enrollment at the state university would make him ineligible to represent his constituents for failure to satisfy constitutional requirements
relating to residence in the home bailiwick. With this lever of ouster,
the group hoped to get its nominee into the General Assembly However, the abuse which the faction used was turned against it; counter
influences were brought to bear on the Department of Law resulting
in a change of opinion. Much of the same sort of thing seems to
motivate requests for opinions concerning voting and elections. Procedure followed in purging names of voters in a favorite target of
requests. All such requests are for purely political purposes, and as
such are, for the most part, abuses of the advisory opinion function.
So often the opinion seems to have been written with only the inquirers side in mind, or with a partiality toward his side. As is true
of some of the justices of our courts, some members of the law department staff are known to have a "bent of mind" on a particular matter.
As a consequence, inquirers on occasion have put forth considerable
effort to get opinions written by one particular assistant attorney
general, or by one other than the one to whom such requests would
normally be assigned. This kind of activity and the abuses described
above result in a general feeling that anybody can get any opinion on
anything. This feeling, substantiated by the frequency of incorrectness and contrariety in the opinions, causes some officials to have no
confidence in this advisory service. This lack of confidence occasionally couples with a distaste for the authoritarianism sometimes encountered in the attitude of the Department of Law, causing an official
to abstain from any utilization of the function, thereby making it of
no benefit to that officer's activity
To a great extent the effects of the advisory opinion function can
be improved by such means as have already been suggested, i.e.,
stricter compliance with the statute which forms the basis of the
function; more careful preparation of the authorized opinions; less
binding effect on the administration. Considerably more improvement
could come from a respect for, or at least a recognition of, one of the
most basic principles of administration, channeling. Within the limits
of reasonable application, the use of this principle would avoid some
confusion and lighten the law department's load. Many unauthorized
requests for opinions should be referred to the department with whose
activity it is concerned. Even an authorized request should be made
to go through the head of the department to give the chief an oppor-
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tunity to handle it or at least make comment on it. Such a request
should also be referred to any other department which might be
affected, so as to allow that department to endorse it with suggestions
from its side of the picture. Along this same line, the advisory opinion
function would be limited more to its true purpose if care were taken
to distinguish between an official and an employee. The latter is not
entitled to a written opinion under the statute. His request should
be sent back to the department where it wil probably be adequately
answered. To answer such a request is to write an unnecessary opinion
which might cause trouble; to deal directly with anyone in the department besides the department head is to show lack of due regard
for the position of the chief. Of course, practical application of these
ideas should always be subject to exception based on sound discretion.
If opinions are given to political subdivisions, requests for them should
be forced to come through proper channels. Inquiries from officials
in cities and within a county should be first directed to the city or
county attorney;82 then, if he is unable to answer them satisfactorily,
they should be forwarded to the Attorney General. The load on the
Department of Law could be lightened still further by funneling requests from county attorneys through commonwealth attorneys, where
answers could be provided for many of the problems. This would
require substantial changes in the office of the Commonwealth Attor8 3'
ney before it could be at all practical.
The Efficiency Commission in its report noted that many.requests
come from county officials who appeared not to have confidence in
their county attorneys8 4 This suggests that these dissatisfied officials
should have a higher authority from which to request legal advice.
Actually, proper conduct of the county attorney's office would not
merely allow such an appeal by a dissatisfied party to be taken through
that office, but would actually expedite such an appeal. The best
-In the Attorney General's speech referred to earlier, he pointed out that the
advising county
amount of departmental work could be greatly reduced by "
See
officials to clear their opinions [requests] through the county attorney.
note 71 supra at p. 137.
The Efficiency Committee suggested subordinating county attorneys to the
Attorney General, as local attorneys general for advisory purposes. See note 2
supra at p. 12.
" In Maryland the Attorney General is required to furnish written opinions to
the legislature, chief executive, auditor, and states attorneys. MnD.CoNsr. Art. V
sec. 3. In Missouri. written opinions are available to "any circuit or prosecuting
attorney" as well as state officers. II Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. sec. 12899 (1939). In
Florida, the Attorney General not only is required to give opinions to state attorneys, but also has general superintendence over them. FLA. STAT. ANN. sec. 16.08

(1911).

"'
See

note 2 supra at p. 12.
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answer to this lack of confidence, however, probably lies m a more
careful use of the ballot.
Where private interests are allowed to have free legal advice, they
too should be required to direct their requests initially to their county
attorney This may not be an adequate arrangement for public needs,
or perhaps the county attorney's office is not set up for such work.
If there are genuine public needs for a state-wide legal information
service (a question worthy of study), a separate office for this purpose
should be provided by the General Assembly Such an office could
be established within the judicial branch of the government (for general supervision only), which would give it a greater degree of impartiality Thus the chief law officer would be free to be a full-time
advisor to the state government, as it was intended he should be.
For still other reasons the Attorney General should abandon the
philosophy that all advice-seekers need help, and that the Department
of Law is the only place they can get it. Whether help is really needed
or not is usually quite difficult to determine from the letter requesting
the opinion. It is hardly thinkable that the chief law officer should
undertake to make such determination. For certain, the idea that
the only place the requester can get good advice is the law department, is as wrong as it is impractical. A whole profession of practicing
attorneys is available for such purpose. Though a fee may be charged,
it would not be unreasonable to assume that any questions worthy of
the consideration of the Commonwealth's chief lawyer is worth the
cost of a fee. Giving legal advice to private corporations, for instance,
not only amounts to government interference with lawyers' right to
earn a living, but it is also an unfair discrimination in favor of that
corporation's expense account, against other corporations. It can be
safely asserted that most of the personal requests for written opinions
come from parties quite able to hire counsel.8s As to those few inquirers who cannot afford a lawyer, it need not yet be despaired that
there are no more in the profession who would willingly provide such
service to the poor, free of charge. It must also be remembered that
many questions of a semi-public nature can usually be answered welloften better, sometimes best-by that office with whose activities the
"-Some of the more typical inquirers as well as inquiries were indicated in the
Attorney General's speech already cited. In his words: "
the business man, the
corporation, or the lobbyist will bombard the Attorney General's office for an
opinion as to the constitutionality of the proposed bill, as it acts adversely on themor it may be a tax added on their business." He may or may not have had these
inquirers in mind when he said in another place that his work could be greatly
reduced by advising "
that individuals obtain opinions from their private or
personal attorneys." See note 71 supra.
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question is directly related. As a general rule inquiries addressed to
the operating arms of our government get prompt and courteous
answers.
Since the time that this study was undertaken, some opinions
publicized in Kentucky newspapers have contained suggestions that
the inquirer see his county attorney or, better yet, his own personal
lawyer. These suggestions introduce an element almost unknown to
this function in this state for many years, and indicate an intention
to carry out the purposes announced in the chief lawyer's speech
quoted above. For this departure from the custom of its predecessors,
the present administration of the advisory opinion is to be commended.
There are ill-effects on the public as well as on the legal profession,
not only indirectly by affecting administration, but also directly by
creating confusion in the minds of many citizens as to how it all
works and what the law is. To those not more than barely acquainted
with law and political science, it is most perplexing to notice m the
newspaper that the law is found to be thus and so by the Attorney
General; then to read later that the Attorney General says the law is
not that, or that a court has held that such is not the law at all, or
that some administrative act is being accomplished despite the fact
that it is not in accord with what the Attorney General had found the
law to be. To the layman the law, normally one of society's more
stable elements, appears to be an undependable sort of thing He can
hardly be criticized for considering opinions of the Attorney General
as part of the law when many men of the state so deem it.
Of course, conflicts within the framework of government make
interesting news so they are usually accompanied by publicity adverse
to good administration-publicity which serves to carry the effects of
the confusion to the general public. Humorous situations that can
occur as a result of such conflicts make the advisory opinion function
look somewhat like a sport. Such is the appearance indicated by an
Associated Press article, which said in part:
"Frankfort, Ky., Nov. 4-If you want to risk becoming a
legal guinea pig, try carrying a shot-gun for the next two weeks.
"The State Game and Fish Commission says you can't
says you can.
carry one. Assistant Attorney General
"Chances are that someone who violates the Commission s emergency regulation will be hauled into court. Lawyers will
use him, somewhat like laboratory technicians use guinea pigs, to test
validity of the regulation."

The amount of publicity given to advisory opinions causes some
"The

Courer-Journal, Nov. 5, 1949, sec. 2, p. 1, col. 1.
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officials to feel that the service is not suitable for some of their work.
As was pointed out at first, state-wide newspapers were publicizing an average of one opinion a day This emphasis on publicity has
caused some officials to feel that the Attorney General is not enough
their own official lawyer to consult with him on certain matters. They
fear the likelihood of premature publicity which would put the government at a disadvantage in dealing with or bargaining on an activity This is particularly the case in regard to matters which should
not be made a matter of immediate public knowledge, e. g., proposed
government contracts.
It has been noticed, however, that the amount of publicity has been
considerably reduced since tis study was commenced. The same
correspondents estimate that since the beginning of the year, they
have been distributing only about two opinions per week to their
associates. Whatever the cause, this indicates a change for the good.
It should tend to reduce the reluctance of some officials to entrust all
their legal problems to the law department. It must not be overlooked,
however, that responsibility lies with the requesting official to indicate
the confidential nature of his request.
Underlying much of the adverse publicity and resultant confusion
is another administrative weakness-the failure to make any helpful
distribution of copies of opinions. The practice has been to make
seven copies in addition to the original which is sent to the inquirer.
One copy goes to the writer of the opinion, two copies are put in the
files, and four are put in a hopper for the press. In contrast with the
consideration given the press, there is no general distribution of
opinions to the rest of the divisions of government nor even a special
distribution to the department whose activities are related to the problem dealt with in the opinion. The rest of the government goes unadvised unless by chance the opinions are called to its attention. In
an illustration given above concerning an inheritance tax problem, the
revenue department learned of the Attorney General's opinion on the
problem, to which the revenue department had devoted much time
and effort, by noticing it in the newspaper. This is hardly a reliable
method of distributing government information to the government.
This administrative weakness can be embarrassing. For example, the
law department issued an opinion that, although the law requires support of old people by their kin, if a particular case merits it, old age
assistance may be given even where there are kin who should take
care of them. Newsmen, interested in this matter, turned naturally
to the department which handled it, to get a reaction. The department
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head had to qualify his position with the remark, "I have not yet seen
"87
the ruling of the Attorney General.
It seems that there would be nothing but gain in sending copies
of opinions to all government departments, or at least to departments
with whose activity the opinion deals. In addition, the other departments should be given at least a day to consider the opinion for the
purpose of discovering oversights and misunderstandings so that these
discrepancies could be cleared up before the opinion is released to
either the inquirer or the press. The value of opinions as news would
not be impaired by the loss of a day because of the nature of opinions.
Both the public and the inquirer would stand to gain as a result of
this additional precaution. The day allowed for consideration by other
departments could be the same day that the chief law officer uses for
approving opinions written by the assistants, thereby involving no
additional time loss.
Thus we see there is under the present operation of the function a
failure to use administrative channels for both the submission of the
requests and the distribution of opinions. An interesting illustration
of this kind of administrative rust, as well as most other ill-effects of
current operation, occurred in relation to the activities of the Game
and Fish Commission. The Department of Law received a request
for an opinion as to the legality of arrests made by certain parties
designated by the inquirer as State Deputy Game Wardens. The
Attorney General wrote the following opinion in reply.
"I have your letter
and I have carefully considered
the questions involved.
"After examimng the statutes, I called the Game and Fish
Commission and they have advised me that they have not given any
authority for the appointment of Deputy Game Wardens.
"There is no power in the law of this state authorizing
a State Game Warden to appoint Deputy Game Wardens. You, I am
sure, know that no officer of the state can appoint deputies without

statutory authority, and a deputy officer must take the oath of office
and executive bond before he can act.
"I am informed that the so-called State Deputy Game
Wardens have not taken the oath of office or executed bond. Therefore it is my opinion that all of there [their] actions in the sup-

pose [-d] capacity of the State Deputy Game Wardens are illegal
and void acts."'

More than two weeks later an attorney wrote the Department of
Law pointing out that authorities were seeking to nullify the arrests
on the assumption that the arresting officers were deputized by local
ITThe Courmer-Journal, Nov. 11, 1948, sec. 2, p. 1, col. I.
"Files of the Attorney General, op. no. 27,706.
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wardens, when actually they held signed and sealed commissions from
the Director of Game and Fish as Voluntary Game Wardens. A new
opinion was written to the attorney,
"Actually there is no statutory authority for the use of
the title 'Game Warden but the Director does have the authority
granted by KRS 158.080 to appoint as many 'conservation officers'
Further by KRS 150.072, the Director is
as may be required.
authorized when an emergency exists, to make emergency appointments for not more than 90 days.
this will advise you that appointments made by the
are valid."
Director of the Division of Game and Fish

A few days later the Director of the Division of Game and Fish
wrote the Attorney General:
paper which states that
"I have a clipping from the
the Attorney General said there was no provision of the law of this
state authorizing a state game warden to appoint deputy game
wardens.
the [inquirer] in asking for your opimon did not
represent the facts in this case and in a conversation with him over
the telephone he told me he did not know the true situation and
would be glad to be corrected.
"I would like, therefore, to have an opimon from you
as to the above facts as to whether these men are bona fide officers of
the Division of Game and Fish."'

In reply to the Director the law department sent the following:
to the effect
"We have recently rendered an opimon
that conservation officers appointed by the Director of the Division
are valid. We enclose a copy of that opimon
of Game and Fish
for your infornation."'

It is only reasonable that the Division of Game and Fish should
have received a copy of anything so. vitally connected with its work,
without having to ask for it. Referring that first opimon to the division
for examination before it was released would undoubtedly have led
the division to suspect that there was a misunderstanding and thus the
consequences of having, the arrests run the gauntlet from questionable,
to illegal, and then to valid in such a short lapse of time, would have
been avoided. Better yet, suppose the inquiry had been referred to
the Division of Game and Fish as a matter of course. The preparation of the opinion would have had the benefit of a corrected fact
picture, and citations to more controlling statutes. It is quite possible
that the Director of the division could have cleared the matter up
through administrative routine to such satisfaction that the inquirer
would have withdrawn his request, eliminating the need for any forOp. cit. supra op. no. 27,812.
Op. cit. supra attached to op. no. 27,812, and dated Sept. 21, 1949.
"Op. cit. supra attached to op. no. 27,812, and dated Sept. 22, 1949.
'o
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mal opinion, much less two. 9 2 Whenever any question arises as to the
legality of an official act, there should be something closer to a presumption of its validity-at least enough to require a more complete
investigation before pronouncing such an act illegal.
The second opinion of the two set out just above was properly
supported by statutory citation. Not all opinions are that carefully
written. For example, examine the following opinion answering a
request from a superintendent of schools. It is set out in full as a
startling example of a curbstone disposal of a very important matteran opinion which is especially disturbing since it offers some new
law in much the same loose manner.
"This is in response to your telephone inquiry and your
for purpose of floodwall
relative to the assessment
letter
construction.
"It is a general rule of law often stated by the Court of
Appeals that school districts are not required to pay for street assessments, sidewalk improvements, etc., by the cities as this is a matter
to be taken care of by the local government and is not expending
money for school purposes only as provided both by Constitution and
the statutes."However,
I am of the opimon that a different situation
prevails in a floodwall assessment, as it involves direct personal protection of property and is as much for school purposes in this particular type of case as the erection of the building itself. Without
going into an extended discussion of the legal principles involved, I
School Board should pay this
will say that, in my opimon, the
assessment."'

A statute provides that the Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall decide all controversies involving the proper administration of
public schools, but in all such matters he shall freely consult the
Attorney General. This request should have been channeled through
the Department of Education even in absence of the statute. The

statute makes the interpretation of school law the particular responsibility of the head of the education department. That department
not only had already interpreted this particular rule of law, but had
also established a policy that any such payment of a local assessment
rOThe need for more than one opinion on the same point as a consequence

of failing to make real distribution of opinions was mentioned in the Attorney
General's speech, supra, without any apparent recognition of the cause of this
trouble. He said:
"One agency will want to adopt a regulation. He seeks an opinion as to its
legality, and once it is adopted, another officer or section will ask an opinion as to
the procedure to be followed in carrying out the term of the regulation. The person or persons, affected by the regulation will next ask an opinion as to its legality,
that is, as to whether or not the regulation is constitutional. So you see the Attorney General is called upon for an opinion on nearly every phase of the administration of the law and regulation, which, of course, requires a lot of time, a great deal
of research and some diplomacy." See note 71 supra.
"Files of the Attorney General, op. no. 26,166.
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is not expending school money for school purposes-a policy which
had been followed for a couple of decades, and one which is quite
reasonable considering the Kentucky Constitution, the statutes and
the cases, all of which have withstood attacks for many years. Unusual m the light of the effect often given to written opinions, but not
unexpected considering the substance and nature of this opinion, the
Superintendent of Public Instruction advised the local school board
not to pay the tax. The Attorney General's opinion is being used as
the basis of a suit against the school board for collection of the floodwall tax. The conclusion in the opinion is far from unreasonable, but
is subject to the question: Is it near enough to law to be given as
official legal advice in a written opinion, which is so likely to be given
something similar to judicial effect? Offering mere conclusions unsupported by law is not sound practice and often acts as a cloak for
insufficient consideration; it too closely resembles law enforcement
rather than counsel.
Attorney general advice can be given too loosely as well as too
easily On one occasion a local officer called a government department on the telephone. One of the minor employees who answered
the phone was instructed to tell him that such an inquiry as his would
have to be submitted to the departnient in writing. Dissatisfied, the
caller asked the office employee to find out for him from the law department what the law of the question was, while he held the line.
Apparently not realizing the possible consequences, the Department
of Law gave an oral opinion which the office employee then relayed
to the caller. Action was taken on the basis of this advice, resulting in
serious repercussions. The law as given in the oral advice did not fit
the facts-a normal result when given under such circumstances.
Because of difficulties already indicated in studying the operation
and effects of the advisory opinion function, the opinions and illustration of effects in this survey are neither typical nor necessarily the best
examples of their class; they are merely the product of chance. As has
already been indicated, opinions are withdrawn physically as well as
officially, leaving blank spaces in the research. Many opinions arouse
curiosity but cannot convey full meaning without other facts which
would go to make up the total situation. How far short this research
falls, or how much over-emphasis is contained herein is very difficult
for anyone to say, since it is not limited to a period of time covered
by the at-hand experience of any person, so rapidly do government
people usually change offices. It has been shown, however, that there
are considerable ill-effects on government administration, on the legal
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profession, and on the public, as a consequence of the manner in
which the advisory opinion function has been exercised.
That this function is a useful, probably essential part of modern
government, was presumed and is conceded. It reduces the need for
judicial advisory opinions. Its purpose is to assist admmstration in
the legal phases of its work, and under existing statutes it is the best
source of legal advice for the government. Its advantages are selfindicative: unlawful administrative acts are decidedly reduced; and
in consequence of that, occasions for suits against the state are cut
down; and in consequence of both, government expenditures are decreased and government efficiency is increased. It is of special benefit
to law enforcement officers, exercising a unifying influence over their
activities and over interpretation of laws among government officials
both in the state capital and throughout the Commonwealth. These
are believed to be the intended results. These should be the effects
of the function.
To accomplish these ends with a minimum of interference with
other governmental activity, this function must not only be improved
in character, but also confined in its application, and limited in its
effect. Present practices indicate a lack of appreciation for the judicial
system, especially procedural aspects. The giving of opinions to persons not authorized by statute to receive them provides a gratuitous
service far beyond that contemplated by the statute, and constitutes an
invasion of private law business, as well as a burden on the Department of Law Excessive legal advice is apt to result in settlement of
practical matters with strained legal technicalities. Promiscuous advice causes trouble, and results m lack of confidence. Giving too much
weight to these opinions suppresses beneficial and experimental effort
on the part of administrators, and sometimes unnecessarily obstructs
the fulfillment of legislative purposes. Thus exercised, the function
plays a role out of proportion, out of balance, with the rest of the government. It amounts to a kind of branch of unadjudicated law, sometimes creating confusion, and sometimes resulting in more harm than
help . 4 The net effect of all this was enough to give one observer
cause to say, with more humor than reason, "What do we need the
lawyers and courts for? For a penny postcard you can find out what
the law is from the Attorney General."
"' This same idea was expressed in a manner which revealed the atti tude of
some diviions of administration: "Opinions of the attorney general frequently adNance rather than retard the development of the educational program." Improving
Education zn the Southern States, Bull. No. 1, 1942, p. 68. Although this function
ivas designed to be a service rather than a hindrance, the educators found significance in the fact that it was in fact often helpful.
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IN CONCLUSION

Suggested Rules and Regulations For the Exercise
of the Advisory Opinion Function
The nature of government-its size, complexity, its separated and
scattered activities-make it the easy target of criticism. The same
considerations leave plenty of room for suggestions and improvements.
Those persons best qualified to make suggestions are those with experience-public servants who work at the business. But even they have
difficulty in getting good perspective of the whole picture, and worse
yet, are usually too busy at the combined tasks of performing their
official function and making necessary plans for their personal future,
to give much attention to improving the government. Then too, the
turnover which occurs with the changes of the party in control reduces
the amount of experience normally acquired in any one field. As a
consequence, constructive help often comes from outside the activity,
sometimes from special committees and commissions set up for that
purpose. 9, This should be not less true of the advisory opinion function. The problem is especially great in Kentucky, because of the
extreme load of work being carried by the comparatively small staff in
the Department of Law which makes it difficult to concentrate on
inprovements or even to question the limits of the function. The result is that the function is exercised in varying intensities and over a
rambling course with complicating effects. This study has accomplished its main purpose if it has shown the need for some boundaries
to this function.
An additional purpose will be served if this study could qualify
as an outside source of constructive help. Suggestions requiring
change in statute and structure, and reallocation of personnel and of
duties are easy to make, and are not without merit; but many ideas
requiring little, if any, such basic alterations can be abstracted from
this study In Kentucky, the Department of Lav, unlike other of the
constitutional administrative departments, 0 has no regulations filed
with the Secretary of State. In the belief that the gleanings of this
study can be constructively helpful, and that they would be more
helpful if presented in some useable form, a set of proposed regulations and rules are submitted for controlling the advisory opinion
function. These suggestions summarize all of the important ideas
For example, the Statute Revision Commission, the Efficiency Commission of
Kentucky, the Constitution Review Commission of Kentucky, and many others.
.. 6The Department of Agriculture and the Department of Education have many
regulations on file.

See KENIUCKY'S ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (1936).
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herein presented, and indicate the conclusions reached. Neither the
rules nor the regulations are necessarily definitive. They are made
with all due deference to the experience and know-how of those who
have worked with this activity
The regulations are such as should be promulgated so as to be
effective throughout the stateY7 The rules are principles which could
serve as a sort of standard operating procedure for the function, applying only to the Office of the Attorney General. The adoption of any
or of all of these rules and regulations would tend to relieve law departments which are overworked, to stabilize the performance of duty,
and to increase the benefits of the advisory opinion function in any
government."
PROPOSED REGULATIONS:
The Department of Law, acting pursuant to authority inherent in constitutional administrative departments, and deeming it necessary to the administration
of its duty to furnish written opimons, adopts the following regulations:
1. The Department of Law is authorized to furmsh written opinions to state
officers, departments, commissions, and agencies in regard to ,their official
duties. Unauthorized requests will not be answered. (These regulations
could be altered to conform to any state statute or constitution.)
2. The Department of Lav is not authorized to furmsh written opinions to Commonwealth, County and City Attorneys. However, as chief law officer of the
state and its political subdivisions, the Attorney General will advise these
officials in matters properly researched and prepared by them.
:3. Requests for opimons made by departments, commissions, and agencies must
be endorsed by the head of the department, commission or agency.
4. Opinions regarding expenditure of state momes will be furished only to the
state auditor. Other officials should send requests of this kind to the auditor.
5. An opinion should be requested only when a bona fide need exists in the
party requesting it as to the performance of his official duties. No opinion
should be requested merely to see what the Attorney General thinks about a
matter.
6. All requests must contain a complete statement of the situation creating the
problem together with a clear, concise question of law. Only questions of
law will be answered.
" Regulations which are to be filed and published in Kentucky are, with exceptions, those which are general in nature and are applicable throughout the state.
Ky. REV. SmT. 13.010 (1948). Many of the suggestions included in these regulations are based on opinions of the United States Attorney General. See 6 C. J. 811
and notes. A few are the same as some of the recommendations of the Southern
States Work-Conference on School Administrative Problems. Improving Education
in the Southern States, Bull. No. 1, 1942, pp. 68-69.

"'The Office of the United States Attorney General has been studied and portrayed interestingly in a book by former Attorney General Homer Cummings and
Carl McFarland, formerly Assistant Attorney General. FEDERAL JusTIcE, The MacMillan Company, New York (1937). This book is an invaluable sotirce on the
advisory opinion function at the federal level.
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7. The Department of Law will not furnish opimons as to the exercise of discretion, or the advisability of bringing, suit; neither will it furnish opinions on
questions scheduled for a determination by the courts. Opinions will not be
furnished regarding the constitutionality of economic or social legislation, or
involving any purely political question.
8. All of the foregoing regulations are subject to, exception where special circumstances can be shown to warrant such exception.
9. All opinions of the Attorney General are advisory only and not binding on
the Commonwealth or any department thereof.
10. For a particularly difficult and important problem of law, officials should resort to a Declaratory Judgment action wherever possible.
PROPOSED RULES:

1. Be familiar with and understand the regulations of the Department of Law.
2. Before writing an opinion, consult the department whose activity is related
to the problem in the request, for the purpose of becoming better acquainted
with the problem, so as to anticipate legal consequences. If more than one
department is affected, arrange a conference among the representatives of
each.
8. Write no unnecessary opinions. Give no advice on administrative detail, but
leave such matters to the resources of the administrator. Under no circumstances give any unsolicited advice.
4. All opinions will be based on careful, thorough investigation of cases, statutes,
and regulations, always with the benefit of deliberation essential to legal work.
The files will be checked for old opinions on the subject before an opinion
is written.
5. Always state grounds on which an opinion is given. Do not discourage new
departures from old standards; make no judgment concerning disposition of
the matter about which the advice is given. The purpose of this function is
to counsel as to the law, not to enforce it.
6. Do not give answers to close questions. If a substantial number of members
of the legal staff of the Department of Law cannot agree with the conclusion
reached in an opinion, it will not be released without both conclusions and
a reminder of the merits of seeking a Declaratory Judgment.
7. No opinion will be withdrawn either from the files or from a government
agency. An opinion that is wrong will be superseded with a new ones explaining the error in the wrong opinion. This is a legal function similar in
some ways to the activities of courts, so should be patterned as closely as is
practicable to judicial procedure.
8. One copy of each proposed opinion will be distributed to each department
as soon as it has the approval of the Attorney General.
9. No opimon will be sent officially to the inquirer or released to the press until
the day after it is distributed.
10. Informal, private consultation is to be encouraged as a means of advising administrators.
11. Advice will be given to all government attorneys of the state and of its political subdivisions as to points of law researched and prepared by such
attorneys.
12. All rules of this department are subject to the discretion of the Attorney
General,
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